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Chapter 5
Unmanned Remotely Operated Search 
and Rescue Ships in the Canadian Arctic: 
Exploring the Opportunities, Risk 
Dimensions and Governance Implications
Jinho Yoo, Floris Goerlandt, and Aldo Chircop
Abstract This chapter is a proactive risk exploration of hypothetical remotely 
operated search and rescue (SAR) ships in the Canadian Arctic. The harsh and 
remote environment in the region, combined with complicated coastlines and many 
uncharted or poorly charted traffic routes, makes it one of the most challenging 
SAR areas. Canada has committed itself to safety, environmental protection and 
sovereign presence in the area by maintaining joint SAR centres of federal govern-
ment departments and mobilizing private volunteers. The characteristics of Canadian 
SAR response in the Arctic rest with its high dependency on heavy equipment such 
as aircraft, helicopters and icebreakers, entailing prolonged hours of response time. 
As recent climate change impacts and maritime traffic increase in the northern 
waters disclose safety gaps, innovation in SAR assets is anticipated. The safety gaps 
may be filled by state-of-the-art remote control technology. This chapter discusses 
remotely operated unmanned ships for SAR response, exploring their opportunities, 
risk dimensions and governance implications.
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Could we imagine a ship remotely controlled from a distance of 8000 km? This 
long-distance test has been successfully passed, and a vessel-borne sensor with 
machine learning has advanced to identify the brand name of beer cans in the water 
(Wärtsilä 2017; Baraniuk 2017). The Yara Birkeland, an 80 m-long autonomous 
cargo ship, is expected to be in service within a few years (Baraniuk 2017). Notably 
in May 2019, the first-ever remotely controlled cargo ship completed a 22 h-long 
voyage between the United Kingdom and Belgium with a maximum payload capac-
ity of 2.5 tonnes (Amos 2019).
Drones have been tested in the Canadian Arctic for safety monitoring since the 
first remote trial at Alma, Quebec, in June 2017 (Transport Canada 2018). One 
Australian drone successfully searched and rescued persons at sea by dropping an 
inflatable life raft (Haddou-Riffi 2018). In line with these technical innovations, in 
May 2018, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) coined a new term, mari-
time autonomous surface ships (MASS), to describe these new technologies. MASS 
were categorized into four stages: (1) manual operation with automated processes 
and decision support, (2) manned remotely controlled ships, (3) unmanned remotely 
controlled ships and (4) fully autonomous ships (IMO 2018a).
Given the limitations of the present SAR response time (Chase 2013) and the 
safety risks to SAR responders in the Arctic, the authors anticipate the third stage of 
unmanned remotely controlled ships to be able to play a potential role as a break-
through in SAR response. In particular, in parallel with the recent improvements of 
multitier communication systems, unmanned and remotely operated SAR ships 
(RO-SARS) could open a new phase of SAR operations, assisted by a tailored 
design for rescue operation in the Canadian Arctic. Considering wind, current and 
wave height effects, a preliminary conceptual design can feature a high-speed craft 
(HSC) of 24 m or more with a capacity of at least 12 passengers.
However, despite the probable benefits, unmanned RO-SARS would also face 
novel risks, raising safety concerns to various stakeholders (Aven and Renn 2010). 
This chapter aims at exploring the opportunities, risk dimensions and governance 
implications of unmanned RO-SARS in the Canadian Arctic context from the socio-
technical and legal perspectives. The discussion is guided by two research ques-
tions. First, given the Canadian northern SAR context, what opportunities and risk 
dimensions are anticipated if and when unmanned RO-SARS are deployed? Second, 
what governance implications and risk prevention measures can be drawn, consider-
ing preliminary risk assessment of RO-SARS under the International Risk 
Governance Council (IRGC) framework? The outcome of this exploratory analysis 
will likely contribute to developing a conceptual design, risk characterization and 
regulatory model of RO-SARS in later research.
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5.2  SAR in the Canadian Arctic Context
The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR 
Convention), defines “search” as “an operation … to locate persons in distress” and 
“rescue” as “an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial 
medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety” (SAR Convention 
1979, Annex, chap 1). These definitions are overarching principles in designing, 
manufacturing and operating RO-SARS.
5.2.1  Navigational Complexity and Uncertainty 
in the Canadian Arctic
The Canadian Arctic, and in particular the Northwest Passage (NWP), which 
extends 1450 km, is a uniquely complex navigational area consisting of multiple 
routes as shown in Fig. 5.1. Its characteristics include a combination of (1) a huge 
geographical area accounting for 40% of Canada’s land mass (Esri n.d.); (2) an 
extensive and complicated coastline with landfast ice in many areas; (3) an esti-
mated 50,000 giant icebergs as well as drifting ice accompanied by strong winds, 
Fig. 5.1 SAR centres in the Canadian Arctic and the 2018 Akademik Ioffe incident (Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada 2013, 2014)
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spray, fog and waves (Esri n.d.; Arctic Council 2009); (4) complicated sea routes 
through an archipelago consisting of over 90 major and 36,400 minor islands (World 
Atlas 2018); (5) the fact that only 10 per cent of the routes are considered adequately 
charted, although in some areas this figure has improved through recent surveys 
(Struzik 2018); (6) a complete lack of ports with any significant infrastructure; and 
(7) scarce emergency infrastructure for fuel, spare resources and trained personnel.
Most importantly, the Canadian Arctic is not only fundamental to Canada’s 
national identity but is the homeland of Indigenous peoples across the Yukon, the 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut. Canada has maritime boundary disputes and 
incomplete boundaries with the United States in the Beaufort Sea and Denmark in 
the Lincoln Sea (Government of Canada 2010). Most significantly, under interna-
tional law, Canada claims a historic title to the waters of the Canadian Arctic archi-
pelago over which it exercises sovereignty (Chircop et al. 2018). Shipping in the 
archipelagic waters and the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone seaward 
of the straight baselines enclosing the archipelago is governed by stringent national 
law, most especially the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 1970 (AWPPA), its 
regulations and the regulations under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 (Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada 2009; Chircop et al. 2018).
5.2.2  Multilevel Canadian SAR Resources in the Context 
of Increasing Demand
Canadian Arctic SAR is based on shared responsibilities of federal, territorial and 
municipal governments, as well as Indigenous communities, volunteers and com-
mercial sectors (Senate of Canada 2018). SAR response entails reliance on heavy 
equipment, such as the dedicated 35 SAR aircraft (e.g., 17 fixed-wing and 18 rotary) 
operated by the Royal Canadian Air Force (2018), the 23 helicopters operated by 
the Canadian Coast Guard (2016) and the 15 icebreakers of the Canadian Coast 
Guard (2019) (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2009; Senate of Canada 2018; 
Canadian Coast Guard 2019). These resources are mostly deployed in the three 
Joint Rescue Coordination Centres (JRCCs) and two Maritime Rescue Sub-Centres 
run by Canada’s Department of National Defence and the Canadian Coast Guard 
(CCG) (part of Fisheries and Oceans Canada) (Fig. 5.1). Volunteer SAR organiza-
tions include the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary with about 4000 volunteers and 
1100 vessels across 16 bases in the Arctic; the Civil Air Search and Rescue 
Association (CASARA); and the Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of 
Canada (SARVAC) (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2013). Commercial 
vessel operators, such as Fednav and Groupe Desgagnés, have also provided 
assistance.
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Although these SAR resources appear to be considerable, the increased SAR 
demands in the northern region are presumed to exceed existing capabilities. The 
SAR resources are expected to cover both land and sea areas. Covering 18 million 
km2 of land and water, in 2017 the three JRCCs responded to about 10,000 air, 
marine and humanitarian incidents. Each JRCC addresses approximately 3000 inci-
dents every year (Senate of Canada 2018; Office of the Auditor General of Canada 
2013). Over 500 SAR missions were completed in the Canadian Arctic for the last 
5  years immediately preceding 2019, compared with the yearly average of 29.3 
accidents and incidents in the entire Arctic between 1995 and 2004 (Ward 2019; 
Arctic Council 2009).
In 2018, a CCG Arctic base was established in Rankin Inlet as part of Canada’s 
Arctic strategy to involve 14 northern Indigenous communities in SAR operations 
(Government of Canada 2009; Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs 
Canada 2019). The Rankin Inlet Inshore Rescue Boat station in Nunavut will pro-
vide maritime SAR support during the summer season and will be crewed by 
Indigenous peoples trained by the Canadian Coast Guard (Canadian Coast 
Guard 2019).
5.3  Opportunities of RO-SARS
5.3.1  Increasing Vessel Traffic and Precursors 
of Arctic Accidents
The number of ship voyages to the Canadian Arctic increased from 123 in the year 
2005 to 347 in 2016, including 147 voyages for cargo ships, 131 fishing vessels and 
20 cruise/passenger ships (Lasserre 2018). Furthermore, there were 6036 cruise 
passengers in 2016, compared with 1239 in 2005 (Lasserre 2018). In 2017 alone, 
178 vessels made about 400 visits to the Arctic including 32 transits through the 
NWP (LeBlanc 2018a).
Although there have not been massive fatalities in Northern Canada since the 
1990s, some incidents could serve as precursors of disasters in the near future, such 
as the Hanseatic which ran aground with 149 passengers on board in 1996, the 
Clipper Adventurer which hit underwater ledges with 128 passengers in 2010 
(TSBC 2012) and the Akademik Ioffe with 126 passengers, which was grounded in 
2018 (Fig. 5.1) (TSBC 2019). It is plausible to assume that in case of more traffic 
entering the Arctic, the number of incidents will also increase. The year 2017 saw 
71 marine incidents in the entire Arctic, up 29% year-on-year, with 29 total losses 
in the Russian Arctic and Bering Sea between 2008 and 2017 (Allianz 2018). 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to prepare for machinery damage and failure when 
navigating the Canadian Arctic, the conventional biggest cause of incidents in the 
region (Arctic Council 2009).
5 Unmanned Remotely Operated Search and Rescue Ships in the Canadian Arctic…
88
5.3.2  Limitations of the Canadian Arctic SAR Response
Regardless of multilevel SAR resources, geographical remoteness and a complete 
lack of ports have created inherent limitations to the response time in the Canadian 
Arctic in the sense that how fast a response can be made depends on how close 
assets are located (Struzik 2018). Most importantly, the fact that all the JRCCs are 
located at the far south of the country (Fig. 5.1) has caused the average response 
time to be about 10 h under average ice conditions during the navigation season 
(Dalaklis 2019). In the Akademik Ioffe incident in 2018, the SAR flight took 9 h 
from the JRCC in Trenton, Ontario, to the grounding site (Fig. 5.1) (TSBC 2019; 
Struzik 2018). Similarly, SAR ships could take days to arrive at a site and rescue 
people (e.g., Hanseatic incident) due to the vast area and because the average speed 
of vessels on Arctic routes is known to be around 7 to 13 knots, compared with 21 
to 25 knots in open sea (Plass et al. 2015). The number of people who can be deliv-
ered by helicopter is also extremely limited and helicopters need frequent refuel-
ling stops.
Safety gaps and emerging risks have been mentioned at the federal level because 
of multifarious challenges: (1) the limited hydrographic survey and nautical chart-
ing of marine routes, (2) “dead zones” of radio communications, (3) the lack of 
trained SAR personnel, (4) ageing equipment, (5) insufficient icebreaking services, 
(6) the lack of land base connectivity through fibre optics, (7) the low bandwidth of 
satellite communications and (8) prolonged SAR time (Office of the Auditor 
General of Canada 2013, 2014; LeBlanc 2018a, b; Brown 2018). Given the financial 
burden of SAR amounting to over CAD 136.9  million (Canadian Coast Guard 
2018), adding more aircraft, helicopters and icebreakers will not be a continuous 
and sustainable answer. Technical innovation in SAR is required.
5.3.3  The Changing SAR Technology: Remote Control 
and Unmanned RO-SARS
5.3.3.1  Communication Links Under Innovative Improvement
There have been multitier and hybrid approaches to improving marine communica-
tion technologies. Figure 5.2 provides a visual impression of some of these tech-
nologies: low earth orbit satellite services by 2022 (LeBlanc 2018b); Enhanced 
Satellite Communication Project, Polar (ESCP-P) (National Defence 2019); nano 
satellite and microsatellites called the “Gray Jay Pathfinder” (University of Toronto 
2019; Boucher 2019; Cho 2019); and terrestrial systems by fibre-optic cables 
extending to the northern areas (Nuvitik Communications 2018). These develop-
ments are believed to gradually contribute to paving innovative foundations for 
effective SAR communication and response. For example, in May 2019, Canada 
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opened the Marine Communication and Traffic Services Centre (MCTS) in Iqaluit, 
which provided assistance to 112 public and private vessels in the Northern Canada 
Vessel Traffic Services Zone (NORDREG) between 15 May and 31 July 2019 
(Canadian Coast Guard 2019).
5.3.3.2  Remote Control Technology and Unmanned RO-SARS
Among enabling communication technologies, drones are surfacing as an effective 
tool to search in the Canadian Arctic, saving a significant share of the CAD 14,000 
per hour needed for the operation of C130 Hercules aircraft. Drones may be 
equipped with thermal imaging devices, audio transmitter/receivers and emergency 
supplies payloads and are capable of streaming real-time images to a control centre 
(Ward 2019). In addition, unmanned RO-SARS could be a game changer in rescue 
operations, being equipped with a remote ship-to-ship personnel transfer crane, a 
robotic rescue arm to save people from the water, a remote fire extinguisher and a 
remote medical assistance service system.
On the deployment of RO-SARS in northern communities, JRCCs, and other 
stations, safety risks to SAR personnel would be eliminated; the response time 
would be accelerated; and cost-efficiency compared with icebreakers, aircraft and 
helicopters would be enhanced. Furthermore, a complementary solution would be 
provided to the otherwise insufficient SAR infrastructure, a lack of trained person-
nel, many uncharted areas and ageing equipment.
Fig. 5.2 Preliminary system concepts of RO-SARS (the authors’ original concepts)
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5.4  Risk Dimensions of RO-SARS in the Canadian Arctic
5.4.1  Pre-assessment of Risks
Given that technology is strongly associated with risk, it should be noted that 
a technology- led society could turn into a risk-susceptible society (United Nations 
2017). Technology-driven risks could increase when organized irresponsibility 
begins to take advantage of unclear boundaries between ethics, law and technology 
(Beck 1999; FTI Consulting 2018). Modern risk society features the paradoxical 
coexistence of economic progress and increased risk, as well as unintended conse-
quences and hidden risks between systems (Jarvis 2007; Renn et  al. 2011). 
Accordingly, more attention should be paid to neighbouring risk components and an 
adaptive and integrative risk governance combining top-down and bottom-up 
approaches (Renn et al. 2011). In the maritime domain, risk is commonly defined as 
the probability of a defined hazard and the severity of its consequences (IMO 
2018b). However, risk has been getting more complicated and uncertain in the mari-
time sector due to increasingly interconnected sociotechnical issues and related 
governance concerns. As such, the importance of explicitly and systematically con-
sidering uncertainties in the risk characterization has been stressed in recent years 
(Goerlandt and Reniers 2018).
As there are no unmanned RO-SARS in service in the Canadian Arctic at this 
time, the probability and severity of accidents are unknown. However, the expected 
minimum functional components could allow the pre-assessment of risks by explor-
ing risk dimensions that could function as problem-framing, early warning and risk 
screening under the IRGC risk framework (Renn et al. 2011). This pre-assessment 
is based upon pre-existing maritime regulatory regimes, sociotechnical systems of 
ships and seafarers, the present stage of remote technology and the status of 
Canada’s SAR response. The functional heterogeneity of unmanned RO-SARS 
shown in Fig. 5.2 will likely define the nature of risks as systemic under the IRGC 
risk framework, meaning a risk of a high degree of complexity and uncertainty 
(Renn et al. 2011).
5.4.2  Five Risk Dimensions to and from RO-SARS
5.4.2.1  Legality as a Threshold Issue
A potential concern with the deployment of RO-SARS vessels is their legal status. 
Canadian maritime law takes a broad definition of a ship in terms of navigability 
and a shipowner’s intent to use it as a ship (CSA 2001, s 2; Thibeault v. Canada 
2015 FC 162). Unmanned and remotely operated submersibles have been consid-
ered as ships by Canadian courts (Cyber Sea Technologies Inc v. Underwater 
Harvester Remotely Operated Vehicle 2002 FCT 794). As such, it will not be 
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difficult to have unmanned RO-SARS recognized as ships under Canadian maritime 
law with the usual consequences for safety, security, environment protection, insur-
ability and liability. IMO has also defined MASS as a ship (IMO 2018b), and this 
characterization can thus be extended to unmanned RO-SARS. Again, the conse-
quence of this definition is to bring MASS within the regulatory domains of inter-
national maritime safety, pollution prevention and security standards.
A further concern is whether the absence of a crew on board a SAR vessel might 
raise an issue of legality under the international law of the sea and international 
maritime law. The literature has explored possible solutions (Chircop 2017; Yoo and 
Shan 2019; IMO 2018c; Karlis 2018), which include amending regulatory provi-
sions requiring seafarer presence on board, resorting to constructive treaty interpre-
tation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT 1969, art 61) or 
introducing new technology exemptions or equivalency under the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention (SOLAS 1974, regs 
I/4(b) and I/5). The effect of these solutions is to extend, to the extent appropriate, 
the full range of international rules and standards to MASS.
5.4.2.2  The Human Element in Seaworthiness
As in the case of all other ships, SAR vessels are required to be seaworthy. Pursuant 
to the definition of seaworthiness under the Canadian maritime law (Laing v. Boreal 
Pacific 2000 CanLII 16,313), RO-SARS as a ship should be reasonably fit in all 
respects, including SAR operations, to encounter the ordinary perils of the Canadian 
Arctic. “All respects” can be rephrased as the human and technical aspect of sea-
worthiness, which is a central principle in maritime law, to ensure the safety of ships 
under Article 94 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS 1982).
The human element in seaworthiness emphasizes the role of a master and crew 
(SOLAS 1974, regs V/34–1; CSA 2001, s 109(1); Marine Personnel Regulations, s 
215, 216). In particular, the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 1978, Annex, chaps II and III) 
sets mandatory minimum qualification standards for masters, officers and watch 
personnel. With respect to RO-SARS, the assets deployed will not be crewed but 
will be operated by an onshore team or operators on board motherships. SAR remote 
controllers will be required to exercise command skills and make tough decisions in 
a SAR value chain (Aase and Jabour 2015), but without having the benefit of at-sea 
situational awareness. Because irreparable consequences could occur by any failure 
of remote controllers on a real-time basis to understand, direct and cooperate with 
people and ships in distress and other SAR units, it is imperative that remote con-
trollers are appropriately qualified according to generally accepted training stan-
dards (Schmied et al. 2017). Among other things, remote controllers will have to be 
familiar with Volume III of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue Manual, 2000, as amended (IMO 2019). Moreover, remote controllers 
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should be conversant with the rules of the road and ice navigation because 70% of 
navigational negligence worldwide is attributable to the violation of the rules of 
steering and sailing (Maritime News 2019). Indeed, remote technology and the 
human element are inseparable (Rothblum 2000), and it will be necessary to estab-
lish uniform standards for SAR remote controllers and simulator-based remote SAR 
training programs.
5.4.2.3  The Technical Element of Seaworthiness
Seaworthiness of unmanned RO-SARS should be verified for reliability of intercon-
nectivity and interoperability between operation technology (OT) (e.g., sensors and 
software of situation awareness), information technology (IT) (e.g., data collection, 
storage and analysis) and communication technology (CT) (e.g., satellite and ter-
restrial communication systems) in Canadian Arctic operations. Any failure of these 
technical components of RO-SARS could cause serious and unanticipated hazards 
to the safety of the SAR operation. In addition to hull structure, engines, machinery, 
electrical systems and conventional ship equipment, special attention will need to 
be paid to remote technical elements, including sensor technology, communication 
links, cyber safety and cybersecurity, and the interface between RO-SARS and 
remote controllers. Each of these four elements is discussed immediately below. 
More significantly, practical rescue functionality should be added to the conceptual 
design of RO-SARS. After all, human and technical elements of RO-SARS will 
have to prove that their reliability is as capable as the ordinary practice of conven-
tional maritime rescue responders in the Arctic (c.f., Yoo et al. 2019).
A sensor is a device that responds to biological, chemical or physical stimulus 
such as heat, light, sound and pressure, providing a measured response of the 
observed stimulus (ISO 2011). Sensor function is critical for situation awareness in 
a SAR operation. It is enabled by the collection and integration of information from 
on-board sensors (e.g., heat, sonar and sound detection sensors), cameras and the 
automatic identification system (AIS) through satellites (Perera and Murray 2019). 
Even the lookout requirement under the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREG) (COLREG 1972, rule 5) is expected to be fulfilled by 
sensor technology (Lloyd’s Register 2017 Code, chap 4, s 4.1.5; Bruhn et al. 2014). 
However, the quality of data collected through sensors could be compromised by 
fog, rain, temperature, wind, freezing or harsh weather, which makes the resilience 
of sensor functions important when breakdowns occur (Bruhn et  al. 2014; Lim 
2019). As such, a system with a fail-safe design or sensor fusion has been suggested 
(Kim 2017).
The very recent development of communications technology and government 
efforts to improve coverage are enablers for unmanned RO-SARS in Canada’s 
Arctic. Even if sensor technology functions well, the data created from the sensors 
must be seamlessly transmitted to remote controllers as pictured in Fig. 5.2. For this 
to function effectively, RO-SARS will likely rely on a combination of multitier and 
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hybrid satellites and terrestrial communications for ship-to-ship and ship-to-ashore 
data exchange (Aase and Jabour 2015). This combination will allow remote control-
lers to perform remote SAR operations (Fig. 5.2).
In 2017 the ransomware called “NotPetya” attacked the Maersk shipping line’s 
central computer system, halting operations at 76 port terminals and costing the 
shipowner about USD 300 million (Thomson 2017). Cyber incidents can be defined 
as an occurrence that results in adverse consequences to the entire OT, IT and CT of 
a ship and its related systems. For example, a virus could corrupt chart data held in 
an electronic chart display and information system (i.e., cybersecurity), and soft-
ware controlling engines may malfunction due to a lack of compatibility with 
upgraded software (i.e., cyber safety) (Jorgensen 2018). Vulnerability may exist in 
virtual reality bridges, remote control centres and other communication systems. 
Accordingly, there needs to be stringent testing and certification of system safety 
and security, access control, security control, penetration testing and adoption of 
best practices for the protection of OT, IT and CT systems (Woo and Kim 2018; 
Bureau Veritas 2017, s 1, ss 2.6.2). In addition, a system of attack-safety will be 
necessary (Kim 2017). Recently, the IMO amended the requirements for an 
approved safety management system under the International Safety Management 
(ISM) Code (IMO 1993) to take into account cyber risk management (IMO 2017).
The work scope of SAR remote controllers will not be simple but will be com-
prehensive so as to include controlling, navigating, monitoring, searching and res-
cuing. These multifarious functions will require an ergonomic design of the physical 
and psychological work environment in remote control centres ashore or in 
motherships. Most importantly, a ship safety management system for RO-SARS 
and personnel ashore should be put in place as enjoined under the ISM Code 
(SOLAS 1974, chap 9), because there should be a strong link between the hazards 
of the actual operations of RO-SARS and the specific design of the safety 
management system (Valdez Banda et al. 2019).
5.4.2.4  Interaction with Ships in Distress and Other SAR Units
One probable concern of the stakeholders would be the interaction among remote 
controllers, ships in distress and other SAR units. First, to increase communication 
links, remote controllers and remote control centres could be stationed in mother-
ships, northern communities or JRCCs (Fig. 5.2). Second, the operation of RO-SARS 
should be coordinated on-scene to ensure the most effective results with other SAR 
units engaged (SAR Convention 1979, Annex, chap 4, art 4.7). Third, to maximize 
the SAR performance and minimize communication error, remote controllers 
should be better trained and an experienced SAR personnel. Finally, for safer inter-
play with ships in distress and other SAR units, adaptive dynamic positioning 
(Witkowska and Śmierzchalski 2018), safe routeing systems (Lehtola et al. 2019), 
collision avoidance systems (Ozturk and Cicek 2019) and cooperative control algo-
rithms (Almeida et al. 2010) are expected to be useful to RO-SARS.
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5.4.2.5  Effective Design of RO-SARS
Finally, it is the design of unmanned RO-SARS that enables the rescue of people 
from waves, freezing temperatures and floating ice. At the design stage, depending 
on the nature of the voyages, the preliminary length of 24 m or more may entail meet-
ing the requirements of the International Convention on Load Lines (ICLL 1966, 
Annex A, art 5). Further, having the capacity to carry more than 12 passengers will 
require RO-SARS of 15 tonnage or less to hold a “passenger vessel safety certificate” 
issued under the Vessel Certificates Regulations (2007, ss 3, 9, 10). As SOLAS 
defines a passenger ship to be a vessel carrying more than 12 passengers (SOLAS 
1974, regs I/2 and II-1/1), the design of RO-SARS for an international voyage will 
have to factor in the requirements of SOLAS. Most importantly, an effective feasibil-
ity study on design should be made with respect to a ship-to-ship personnel transfer 
cranes, a robotic rescue arm to deliver people out of water, remote fire extinguishers 
and remote medical assistance. The authors of this chapter presume that unmanned 
RO-SARS could contribute to SAR response more likely with respect to rescue oper-
ations in coordination with other search equipment such as drones, satellites and 
aircraft. A further risk assessment of the conceptual design of RO-SARS should be 
made considering rescue-focused functionality, proper power systems for fast navi-
gation comparable to a high-speed craft, energy sources available in the northern 
communities, the proper size and length of the asset for delivery of more than 12 
persons, a reversionary mode of partly autonomous operation in communication 
dead zones and structural strength resistant to floating ice and heavy winds (Lee 2018).
5.4.3  Summary
Given the five risk dimensions of RO-SARS, most aspects of risk dimensions, 
except the risk of legality, are contingent upon sociotechnical developments and 
technical decisions. This complexity and uncertainty makes it difficult to character-
ize the risk of RO-SARS as being tolerable or not under the IRGC risk framework. 
Regardless, this problem-framing could at least serve as an early warning and as a 
basis for specifying design requirements. Moreover, the advantages of RO-SARS, 
especially in actual rescue operations, will not be easily outweighed by these risk 
dimensions. Adaptive designs of unmanned RO-SARS and standardization of oper-
ation will likely serve as an innovative solution to lagging SAR response time.
5.5  Governance Implications
Given the complexity and uncertainty of unmanned RO-SARS in the Canadian Arctic 
context, this risk-reducing SAR response mechanism necessitates close collaboration 
between multilevel governance systems ranging from international regulatory bodies 
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to national institutions, to Indigenous peoples and to private volunteers (Renn et al. 
2011). The human and technical risks of RO-SARS in Canadian Arctic waters will be 
controlled and managed by international and domestic regulatory regimes and 
include the engagement of Indigenous rights-holders and public and private stake-
holders. In the near future, concern assessment and risk communication with rights-
holders and stakeholders under the IRGC risk framework will be also needed.
5.5.1  RO-SAR and International Conventions
Under Article 98 of UNCLOS, every state is obliged to require ships registered 
under its flag to render assistance to people and ships in danger, and every coastal 
state has a duty to promote the provision of infrastructure for adequate SAR ser-
vices, emphasizing mutual regional arrangements between coastal states and neigh-
bouring states. In the same vein, the SAR Convention also requires rescue 
coordination centres to be established by states (SAR Convention 1979, Annex, 
chap 2.3). Moreover, the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Arctic SAR Agreement), to which Canada is a 
party, obligates states parties to implement the most expeditious border crossing 
procedures and establishes a legally binding duty of cooperation, including mutual 
SAR cooperation (Arctic Council 2011, arts 8, 9). Cooperation encompasses infor-
mation exchange including available SAR facilities and lists of available supply 
infrastructure (Arctic Portal 2011). The Agreement is intended to enhance the cross- 
boundary mobility of SAR assets. Accordingly, the regional development and 
deployment of RO-SARS could be seen as supporting states parties’ duties under 
UNCLOS, the SAR Convention and the Arctic SAR Agreement.
5.5.2  Multilayered Regulatory Regimes Applicable 
to RO-SARS
Besides the existence of an international SAR regulatory regime to which Canada is 
a party, RO-SARS deployed in and navigating the Canadian Arctic will also be 
governed by Canadian maritime law concerning registration, safety, security, envi-
ronmental protection, insurability, tort and liability as they will likely be defined as 
a ship under Canadian maritime law. As “naval auxiliaries and other ships owned or 
operated by” government and “used only on government non-commercial service” 
are not bound by the safety of navigation regulations under SOLAS (SOLAS 1974, 
reg V/1), the safe navigation of RO-SARS owned or operated by the Canadian gov-
ernment will be mostly governed by Canadian national law. Moreover, Section 7 of 
the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, also implies that RO-SARS owned by the govern-
ment can avoid the Act by resorting to other new regulations and provides that 
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RO-SARS owned or operated by the Canadian Forces are outside of its application, 
as well as SOLAS and the Polar Code, which applies to ships certified under 
SOLAS. However, it should be noted that even state-owned RO-SARS will be sub-
ject to COLREG, which applies to all ships (COLREG 1972, rule 1). On the other 
hand, privately owned RO-SARS on international voyages carrying more than 12 
passengers, which are more than 24 m in length, are subject to the construction, 
equipment and inspection requirements of SOLAS, as well as the watertight and 
stability requirements of ICLL (Canadian Supplement to the SOLAS Convention, s 
2.1.1.1; ICLL 1966, Annex A, art 5).
5.5.3  Political and Social License from the Arctic States 
and Northern Communities
SAR operations in the Canadian Arctic have a probability of crossing land borders 
and maritime boundaries with the United States and Denmark (Greenland). Even if 
the federal government approves the operation of RO-SARS, other Arctic states 
might not welcome the novel technology in waters under their sovereignty or juris-
diction for safety and security reasons (Lee et al. 2018). Accordingly, political and 
social license in and between neighbouring Arctic states, territories, Indigenous 
peoples and northern communities is important (van der Vegt 2018). Without their 
support, the deployment of both RO-SARS and remote control centres in the North 
could face obstacles. Furthermore, for the effective governance of RO-SARS in the 
Canadian Arctic, the coordination among federal government departments, JRCCs, 
volunteer groups, northern communities and neighbouring states will be essential to 
obtaining full support from aeronautical, maritime and ground SAR units.
5.6  Risk Prevention Measures: Future Research Needs
Rapidly advancing remote technology for ships is poised to open new chapters for 
small cargo delivery (Amos 2019), oil spill response (Maritime Logistics 2019) and 
tugboat operations (Martine 2019), which also suggests new opportunities for SAR 
response in the Canadian Arctic. However, the following risk prevention measures 
which require further research and development are suggested because “risks are 
created and selected by human actors” (Renn et al. 2011).
First, a concept design for RO-SARS needs to be defined in terms of their size, 
length, structure, machinery and SAR functionality. Second, a more complete risk 
characterization should be made with regard to the technical design specification of 
RO-SARS, one which also accounts for stakeholder concerns and risk perceptions. 
Third, the Canadian government should develop uniform standards of qualification, 
training and certification for search and rescue remote controllers in Arctic waters 
(SQ-SARC) in the near future. Fourth, a prototype of RO-SARS should be 
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repeatedly tested, inspected and surveyed through sea trials to verify their human 
and technical seaworthiness and effective interaction with ships in distress, other 
SAR units and relevant technologies, including drones. Fifth, remote controllers 
should be qualified, trained and licensed seafarers for SAR operation under new 
legal standards that would need to be developed, possibly by the IMO as well as 
under Canadian federal law. Sixth, stakeholders should increase multitier satellite 
and terrestrial supports and data transmitters so that the interconnectivity of OT, IT 
and CT can meet the ordinary practices of SAR responders in the Canadian Arctic. 
Seventh, a safety management system specifically for unmanned RO-SARS should 
be put in place with approved training simulators and mandatory procedures 
(Dasgupta 2017). Eighth, the contribution of northern communities to the practical 
operation of remote controllers and remote control centres is a key to the success in 
SAR response in the region (Ward 2019). As such, including these communities in 
the conception, planning and design of the centres, as well as the associated operat-
ing procedures, is highly recommended. Finally, knowledge-sharing and promotion 
of best practices of RO-SARS ought to be taken up by the Arctic Council through 
the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group, perhaps through 
its Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information Forum, or the Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response Working Group or in collaboration with both Working 
Groups (Dalaklis 2019).
5.7  Conclusion
Given the Canadian Arctic context, unmanned and remotely controlled ships could 
considerably enhance and complement Canadian SAR capabilities, particularly res-
cue operations, by reducing response time, infrastructural costs and life risks to 
responders. However, there are complex and uncertain risks that can be identified 
under the IRGC risk framework: the qualification and certification of remote con-
trollers, the technical reliability of sensor technology, the stability of communica-
tion links, the hazards arising from the breach of cyber safety and cybersecurity, the 
probable interface errors between RO-SARS and remote controllers and the new 
design requirements for remote rescue functions such as the remotely operated ship- 
to- ship personnel transfer crane. These risks should be addressed under multilevel 
governance systems comprising international and national and public and private 
stakeholders. Most significantly, it is clear that unmanned RO-SARS are in line with 
the international conventions concerning SAR operations, that there are multilay-
ered regulatory regimes applicable to these novel ships and that these vessels and 
craft should gain political and social license from the Arctic states and northern 
communities.
Nonetheless, the risks of deploying unmanned RO-SARS in the region should 
not be treated as simple. These risks feature a combination of intrinsic heterogene-
ities such as remote technology, the SAR operation itself and the extreme environ-
ment, all of which are complex and uncertain in nature under the terms of the IRGC 
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risk framework. Indeed, although the opportunities for RO-SARS look promising, 
the required technical reliability and actual SAR practicability are unproven in the 
Arctic context. Hence, it is premature to characterize overall risks as intolerable, 
tolerable or acceptable. However, the minimal exploration of the risk dimensions 
taken in the foregoing discussion might trigger feasibility studies and dedicated ship 
design approaches accounting for the different hazards originating from this novel 
technology concept, for which new design approaches for unmanned vessels could 
be applied.
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